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1. Introduction
The latter half of Augustine’s De Trinitate is as much a treatise in human 
cognitive psychology as it is a work in trinitarian theology. Augustine holds that 
our best (and perhaps only) prospect for understanding something of God’s 
trinitarian nature is to study its reflection in the human mind.¹ For, on his view, 
the mind at its deepest (or highest) level possesses a trinitarian structure—one 
that is likewise manifested in its various episodic cognitive acts. And, while the 
most adequate represen-tation of the divine trinity has its locus in the higher 
reaches of human rational activity, traces or quasi-images of the trinity can be 
found even in the soul’s non-rational, sense-based activities.
In this paper, I explore Augustine’s account of sense cognition in book 
11 of De Trinitate. His discussion in this context focuses on two basic types 
of sensory state—what he himself refers to as “outer vision” and “inner 
vision,” respectively. His analysis of both types of state is designed to show 
that our lowest, outermost cognitive acts—i.e., those involving external and 
internal sense faculties—are susceptible of a
¹ In what follows, translations of De Trinitate are adapted (with occasional, slight modifica-tion) from 
the version of Edmund Hill. The editions and translations on which I rely for Augustine’s other works are 
listed in the bibliography.
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trinitarian analysis. In this respect, the theological significance of his
discussion is perfectly straightforward. As a project in philosophical
psychology, however, its significance is rather less obvious. Indeed, it is
far from clear what sense-cognitive phenomena correspond to
Augustine’s notion of outer and inner vision, respectively.
One very natural (and fairly common) way to read De Trin. 11, 
however, is to interpret Augustine’s analysis of “outer” vision as his 
account of sense perception (i.e., of perceptual acts of seeing, hearing, 
touching, etc.) and the analysis of “inner” vision as an account of 
occurrent acts of sensory memory and imagination.² On this reading, 
the division between outer and inner vision yields a mutually exclusive 
and exhaustive division of the main types of sensory state that occur in 
human beings such that all sense-based states turn out to be trinitarian in 
structure.
Although this reading has both an appealing tidiness as well as some 
prima facie textual support, it cannot, I claim, be correct. In what follows, 
therefore, I argue for an alternative reading of book 11. In particular, 
I advance two theses: one negative, one positive. The negative thesis is 
that what Augustine calls “outer vision” is not, in fact, sense perception—
at least not in the ordinary or paradigmatic sense. In making this claim, 
I take for granted that, paradigmatically, sense perception is a kind of 
conscious perceptual awareness. To be sure, there are various forms of 
non-conscious sensory processing (blindsight; or other kinds of non-
conscious, or sub-personal sensory events), but these are not paradig-
matic cases of sense perception. Hence, insofar as we take perception to
² Although I know of no paper which advances such an interpretation as part of a focused, 
exegetical study of perception in De Trin. 11 (partly because there are very few such studies), 
nevertheless, there are treatments of book 11 that clearly do presuppose some such interpret-
ation. Recent examples include: Scott MacDonald, “Augustine’s Cognitive Voluntarism in De 
Trinitate 11,” in E. Bermon and G. O’Daly (eds.), Le De Trinitate de saint Augustin: exégèse, 
logique et noétique (Paris: Vrin, 2012), 322–39 and Mark Kalderon, “Trinitarian Perception,” 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 91 (2017), 21–41. This reading also seems to be 
taken for granted by Peter King, “Augustine on Knowledge,” in D. Meconi and E. Stump (eds.), 
The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014), 142–65, Johannes Brachtendorf, The Structure of the Human Mind according to 
Augustine: Self-Reflection and Knowledge of God in De Trinitate, tr. A. Looney (Hamburg: 
Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000), 193–8, and Luigi Gioia, The Theological Epistemology of Augustine’s 
De Trinitate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 190–8.
be a phenomenally conscious mode of sensory awareness, my negative
claim is that Augustine’s analysis of outer vision is not an analysis of
sense perception. Rather, I claim, in order for the deliverances of outer
vision to reach the threshold of consciousness, outer vision must occur in
conjunction with the activation of the faculties involved in inner vision.
Hence my positive thesis: for Augustine, sense perception is a complex, 
hybrid state—one that involves the tandem operation of both outer and 
inner vision.³ If I am right, the end result is a rather less tidy analysis of 
perception since, on my reading, acts of sense perception turn out not to 
be susceptible to trinitarian analysis. Even so, the account is interesting 
and nuanced for all that.
As will be clear, my argument presupposes not only that Augustine 
recognizes distinctions between different levels or types of awareness, but 
also that such distinctions are plausibly framed in terms of some notion
of ‘consciousness.’ In order to prepare the way for my reading of book 
11, therefore, I begin (§2), first, by clarifying what I mean in 
characterizing a given state as ‘conscious’ and, second, arguing for the 
claim that Augustine has a systematic way of marking the distinction 
between states that are conscious and non-conscious in this sense. In so 
doing, I also introduce the basic cognitive mechanisms Augustine relies 
on to explain such a distinction. Next (§3), I turn to Augustine’s 
discussion of outer and inner vision in book 11 and, thereafter (§4), to 
the defense of my two central interpretive theses. I conclude (§5) with 
some brief observations about how my interpretation finds further 
support and motivation when situated vis-à-vis some of Augustine’s 
broader philosophical and theo-logical commitments.
³ Since beginning work on this paper, I discovered José Silva’s excellent 2014 article on active 
perception in Augustine (“Augustine on Active Perception,” in J. Silva and M Yrjönsuuri (eds.), 
Active Perception in the History of Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 79–98). While Silva’s 
focus is not on questions about consciousness, nor specifically on De Trin. 11, nevertheless, in 
the course of defending a thesis about the soul’s activity in perception, he offers an account of 
perception similar to the one I defend here. Since its publication, there has been some criticism 
of Silva’s interpretation—especially on the issue of whether it is consistent with what Augustine 
says in De Trin. 11. See Kalderon, “Trinitarian Perception” and Silva’s reply in José Silva, 
“Perceptiveness,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, supp. vol. 91 (2017), 43–61. It will be 
clear, however, that my own account of De Trin. 11, in many ways, supports Silva’s position.
2. Consciousness and Levels of Awareness in Augustine
Since there is both a wide range of psychological states that might be
characterized as ‘conscious’ and no standard use of terminology for
classifying various kinds of conscious phenomena, I need to say some-
thing about how I am using the relevant terminology, and how it applies 
to the various psychological phenomena Augustine recognizes and dis-
cusses. For my purposes, talk of ‘consciousness’ is simply a way of 
signaling phenomenality. Conscious states are those that register at the 
level of phenomenal awareness. To say that a given psychological act or 
state of awareness is conscious, then, is just to say that it is experienced 
by its subject; there is, as the familiar refrain goes, ‘something it is like’ for 
the subject to have or be in that state. Thus, conscious states, in the sense 
in which I am interested, are states a subject is aware of or experiences 
herself as being in.⁴
For clarity in what follows, it will be important to distinguish 
consciousness in the foregoing sense not only from cases of complete 
absence of awareness, but also from two other modes of psycholog-
ical awareness: namely, what we might think of as non- or sub-conscious 
awareness, on the one hand, and introspective awareness on the other. In 
speaking of non-conscious awareness, I have in mind psychological 
states that we do not experience, but which nevertheless causally impact 
our conscious thinking and/or our behavior and actions. Thus, while the 
content of sub-conscious states does not feature in conscious experience, 
we do have a kind of unconscious, or functional access to it. Similarly,
⁴ Nowadays, treatments of phenomenal consciousness are very often focused around 
qualia—that is, the purely qualitative features associated with phenomenally conscious states. 
Thus, philosophers often take what-it’s-like talk to refer to its qualitative character—say, the 
particular greenish way the tree appears in awareness. That said, it is also widely acknowledged 
that there may be more to phenomenal consciousness, more to our experience of our mental 
states, than qualitative character. Thus, philosophers from Franz Brentano to Uriah Kriegel have 
called attention to the self-conscious or subjective character of phenomenally conscious states. 
The core idea here is just that phenomenally conscious states are states one is aware of oneself as 
being in. For recent treatments of this aspect of phenomenal consciousness see: Uriah Kriegel, 
Subjective Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) and “Consciousness and Self-
Consciousness,” The Monist 87 (2004), 185–209; Colin McGinn, “Consciousness and Content,” 
in N. Block, O. Flanagan, and G. Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical 
Debates (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 295–308; and Joseph Levine, Purple Haze: The 
Puzzle of Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
. . . in the recesses of the mind (abdito mentis), there are various aware-
nesses of various things (quarundam rerum quasdam notitias), and
they come out somehow into the open and are set, as it were, more
clearly in the mind’s view (in conspectu mentis) when they are thought
about (cogitantur); it is then that the mind discovers and remembers
and understands and loves something which it was not thinking about
while it was thinking about something else. And if it is something that
we have not thought about for a long time and are unable to think
about unless we are reminded of it, then in heaven knows what curious
way it is something that we do not know that we know.
(De Trin. 14.9)
⁵ Since, for Augustine, we come to knowledge of the divine only by first turning inward and
coming to know the nature of our own minds and thoughts, it is no surprise that he gives careful
attention to both the nature and the phenomenology of our various mental activities and states.
consciousness as I am understanding it, is to be distinguished from 
introspective awareness. Introspection is a kind of deliberate, focal, 
attentive awareness of one’s own occurrent conscious states. When we 
introspect, we not only experience our mental states, but we explicitly 
attend to that very experience. Such attention to our own states is, 
however, relatively rare; in the ordinary course of things, our conscious 
experience occurs without our being, at the same time, introspectively 
aware of it.
I call attention to these various modes of awareness as a way of 
introducing some basic distinctions Augustine himself draws in De Trin. 
between different levels or types of awareness.⁵
I should say, however, that Augustine’s clearest presentation of these 
distinctions, and of the cognitive mechanisms associated with them, 
occurs in contexts in which he is focusing on the mind’s higher, and 
purely rational (i.e., intellective) activities. And so it is on these texts that 
I shall, at least initially, be focusing. As will become clear, however, 
Augustine recognizes the same kinds of distinctions (and appeals to 
the same basic mechanisms) in book 11 when discussing inner and 
outer vision.
To get a start at some of the distinctions Augustine draws between 
levels of awareness, consider his observations in the following passage:
Here, the main distinction on which Augustine focuses is between what
I am calling conscious and non-conscious modes of awareness. In his
own terminology, the distinction is between cases in which a given
content occurs within one’s “mental field of view” (in conspectus mentis)
and cases in which such content is present to (or present in) the mind,
but not experienced as such. It is typical for Augustine to signal the 
former, conscious, mode of awareness by using variants of the verb 
‘cogitare.’⁶ While this expression is almost always rendered into English 
as ‘to think,’ a translation that might suggest a specifically intellective 
activity, it is worth noting at the outset that Augustine uses the expres-
sion more broadly to refer to acts of occurrent awareness involving either 
rational or non-rational contents.⁷ Thus, for him, cogitatio involves the 
conscious processing of a given content (whether intellective or sensory) 
in such a way that it is, as it were, before the mind’s eye. Indeed,
Augustine habitually appeals to visual metaphors not only to character-
ize the nature of acts of cogitatio, but also to describe the psychological 
mechanism responsible for conscious awareness. Thus, says Augustine, 
“thought is a kind of sight of the soul” (De Trin. 15.16) wherein “the 
mind’s gaze” (acies mentis, mentis aspectum) is directed upon a given 
content in such a way that one experiences one’s awareness of it.⁸ It is 
worth noting, moreover, that conscious awareness in this sense is to be 
distinguished from introspection; for Augustine, introspection is a mat-
ter of having these very acts of thinking (or knowing or understanding)
⁶ Augustine takes the verb, cogito (“I think”) to be an iterative form of cogo (“I collect”) and 
so an appropriate label for the soul’s activity drawing or bringing together any range of content 
(whether sensory, or purely rational) before the mind’s conscious awareness. See De Trin. 11.6 
and Confessions 10.11.18.
⁷ This will become clear when we turn, in section 3, to Augustine’s discussion of sense 
cognition in book 11, where he speaks of conscious sensory awareness as ‘cogitatio.’ This broad 
usage is also made explicit at De Trin. 15.16, where Augustine points out that “thought is a kind 
of gaze of the soul, whether things are present that are seen with bodily eyes or sensed with other 
senses . . . or whether they are things only taught by the disciplines of a liberal education, or 
whether the higher causes and ideas of all these things are being thought about in their 
unchanging nature.” When Augustine is speaking of conscious thought involving purely 
intelligible contents, he will use ‘understanding’ (intellegere) to characterize the specific type 
of ‘thinking’ (cogitare) in question. In keeping with standard usage, I will continue to translate 
the Latin expressions ‘cogitare’/‘cogitatio’ in the customary way (namely, as ‘thinking’/ 
‘thought’), but the reader must bear in mind the broad meaning of these terms.
⁸ As we will see, when referring to this gaze or view in connection with perceptual awareness 
Augustine speaks of it as the acies animi (soul’s gaze) rather than acies mentis (mind’s gaze).
It is like one who is expert in many disciplines: the things which he
knows are contained in his memory, but nothing thereof is within the
view of his mind except that which he thinks about. All the rest is stored
up in a kind of secret awareness (arcana quadam notitia), which is called
memory . . . . Thus, we say the man knows (nosse) letters even when he is
thinking (cogitat) about other things, not letters. (De Trin. 14.8)¹¹
Here as elsewhere, the mechanism to which Augustine appeals in
speaking of any kind of non- or sub-conscious awareness is that of
⁹ See, e.g., De Trin. 15.16 where Augustine puzzles over how it is that we do not, in fact, see
all of our acts of thinking, while at the same time apparently recognizing that we do not: “Who
fails to see (videt) his own thoughts (cogitationem)? And on the other hand, who does see his
own thoughts? . . .Who fails to see them, and who does see them? After all, thought is a kind of
sight of the soul.” Another context in which Augustine treats introspective awareness is his
discussion atDe Trin. 15.21 of whether we can know that we know, and know that we know that
we know—and so on.
¹⁰ While ‘notitia’ is the nominal form of the verb ‘nosse’ (meaning ‘to know’), it would be a
mistake to think that Augustine uses “notitia” in a technical sense for contents that are known in
any strict, epistemic sense of that term. Indeed, in introducing book 11—which is narrowly
concerned with non-rational awareness—he characterizes his subject matter as “notitia of
bodily things” (rerum corporearum notitia) insofar as it is acquired through bodily senses
(sensu corporis). See De Trin. 10.19. For this reason, I often translate ‘notitia’ as “awareness”
in order to capture this more neutral sense of the expression. Like the expression ‘knowledge,’
‘notitia’ can be used to refer as much to the contents of a cognitive act as to the act itself.
¹¹ Cf. De Trin. 14.9: “This person whom you perceive disputing about geometry is also a
perfect musician, for he both remembers music, and understands, and loves it; but although he
both knows and loves it, he is not now thinking of it, since he is thinking of geometry, of which
he is disputing. And hence we are warned that we have a kind of knowledge of certain things
stored up in the recesses of the mind, and that this, when it is thought of, as it were, steps forth in
public, and is placed as if openly in the sight of the mind; . . . But in the case of that of which we
have not thought for a long time, and cannot think of it unless reminded; that, if the phrase is
allowable, in some wonderful way (I know not how) we do not know that we know. In short, it is
rightly said by him who reminds, to him whom he reminds, ‘You know this, but you do not
know that you know it; I will remind you, and you will find that you know what you had thought
you did not know.’ . . . “But he who cannot contemplate these things, even when reminded, is too
deeply buried in the darkness of ignorance, through great blindness of heart and too wonder-
fully needs divine help, to be able to attain to true wisdom.”
in view. In his terms, then, introspective awareness involves seeing one’s 
thinking (videt . . . cogitationem).⁹
Now, as Augustine frequently reminds us, the contents of the mind far 
outstrip what we presently have in view. In this way, we can be said to 
know (nosse) or have awareness (notitia) of far more than what we are 
presently (consciously) thinking of.¹⁰ Augustine gives numerous 
examples, but one such illustration runs as follows:
turning the [mind’s] view (conspectu) from here to there and there to
here, and again from there or there to this and that, as though one
could not see something unless one stopped seeing other things.
(De Trin. 15.23)¹⁴
¹² Thus, importantly, for Augustine, memory is not a distinct faculty or power of the mind, but
rather the mind itself insofar as it functions in different capacities. This extremely broad notion of
memory characterizes Augustine’s account of memory not only inDe Trin., but in the Confessions
(where Augustine claims that God is among the things inmemoria) and inDe Genesi ad Litteram
(where, in book 12, memory plays an important role in occurrent sense perception). The literature
onAugustine’s theory ofmemory is vast. A very brief, and helpful overview can be found in Roland
Teske, “Augustine’s Philosophy ofMemory,” in E. Stump andN.Kretzmann (eds.),TheCambridge
Companion to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 148–58. See also John
Mourant, Saint Augustine on Memory (Villanova, PA: Villanova University Press, 1980), and
Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987),
chapter 5. Of particular relevance to memory in De Trinitate is Paige Hochschild, Memory in
Augustine’s Theological Anthropology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
¹³ Cf. the case discussed in n. 11 above. This is also the case, as we will see, for non-conscious
sense-based awareness.
¹⁴ Cf. De Trin. 11.12: “But the gaze of the soul cannot look at everything contained in
memory at one glance, and so trinities of thoughts follow one another in succession, and one
gets this innumerably numerous trinity.”
‘memory’ (memoria). As this passage makes clear, moreover, memory 
extends to any content which is retained in the mind, but is not within 
one’s current, conscious field of view. Indeed, for Augustine, memory 
functions broadly as the source or principle of all that we can access in 
occurrent, conscious awareness.¹² As he puts it elsewhere: memory 
constitutes “all that we know, even if we are not thinking of it” (De 
Trin. 15.40). Thus, the contents of memory are not restricted to past 
events or experiences, but rather include “the whole of a person’s know-
ledge together” (De Trin. 15.17). What exists in memory is present to the 
soul in such a way that it not only remains accessible for conscious 
consideration (in some cases, only with great effort), but may also 
actively structure conscious awareness and action.¹³
Now, as we have already noted, conscious awareness, on Augustine’s 
model, is a matter of directing the soul’s gaze so as to bring some content 
into view. Owing to our noetic limitations, however, the scope of our 
capacity for conscious awareness is highly restricted. Thus, of all that is 
psychologically present, known to us, and, thus, held in memory, what 
appears in conscious awareness does so only “bit by bit and one by one” 
and, as Augustine explains, only as a result of one’s
What we consciously experience is, therefore, to some degree, up to us.
Indeed, Augustine thinks that, in many cases, what we know or become
aware of is to be explained by appeal to the contribution (or failure
thereof) of our will.¹⁵ Indeed, it is this feature of Augustine’s account of
consciousness that secures his trinitarian analysis of it. For, as we shall
see, on Augustine’s analysis, every occurrent act of cognition involves not 
only an object, on the one hand, and an act of awareness of it, on the 
other, but also an action or volition on the part of the subject in directing 
her attention to the object thus cognized. Hence consciousness is itself a 
trinitarian structure: acts of conscious awareness involve (i) the soul’s 
gaze (acies) being (ii) intentionally directed via the will (voluntas) to (iii) 
some object or content present to it.
As there will be occasion to return—at some length—to Augustine’s 
trinitarian analysis of conscious awareness in connection with his
account of sense-based cognition, the foregoing will suffice for the 
discussion to come. I now want to turn to book 11 and to Augustine’s 
account of outer and inner vision.
3. Outer Vision and Inner Vision in De Trin. 11
As I have indicated already, the overarching thesis that drives Augustine’s 
project in De Trinitate is the idea that the human mind is itself a likeness 
and image of the divine Trinity.¹⁶ While, strictly speaking, this trinitarian 
image lies solely in the intellect, Augustine holds that traces of it redound 
even to the lowest—i.e., non-rational—operations of the soul. Thus, as a 
way of elucidating the image of the Trinity as it exists in the
¹⁵ See De Trin. 9.18 and 10.4 for a discussion of the role of will in knowing. The role of will in 
sense cognizing will be explored in more detail below.
¹⁶ Drawing on Genesis 1:26, Augustine takes it as given that humans are the imago Dei; we 
are, in other words, created in God’s image and likeness. Given God’s Trinitarian nature, 
moreover, Augustine likewise takes for granted that humans bear the image and likeness of the 
divine Trinity. Insofar as the locus of this image of the Trinity is the human mind, it is possible, 
Augustine thinks, to come to some understanding of the Trinity by turning inward and studying 
the nature of our own mind and thoughts. In this way, he thinks we come “somehow to see him 
by whom we were made by means of this image which we ourselves are, as through a 
mirror” (De Trin. 15.14). For an exploration of the question of how the discovery of such images 
aids knowledge of the divine see Peter King, “Augustine’s Trinitarian Examples,” Medioevo 37 
(2012), 83–106.
soul at the highest level, Augustine proposes to begin by exploring models
of the trinity as they are found in these lower—more familiar, more
accessible—cognitive activities.¹⁷ In this, Augustine pursues a characteris-
tic ascent from exterior to interior and from inferior to superior. In
book 11, therefore, he begins by examining the sensory-functions of “the
outer human being”—that is, the human person with regard to its capacity 
for sense-based cognition of material bodies.¹⁸ The project, as Augustine 
characterizes it, is “to look for some model of the trinity in this human who 
is decaying; for even if it is not a more accurate model, it may perhaps be 
easier to distinguish.” In this regard, book 11 is a remedial exercise: a way to 
begin preparing us for the ideas to come. In subsequent books, Augustine 
gradually ascends to images of the Trinity as they exist in ‘inner human 
being’—that is, in the human person with respect to its capacity for various 
kinds of rational activity.¹⁹
What all this means, then, is that, in book 11, Augustine is not merely 
focusing on sense-based cognitive states, but focusing on them in such a way 
as to wholly exclude the contributions of higher, rational or intel-lective 
faculties in judging or interpreting sensory content. For, on Augustine’s view, 
what pertains to the outer human being is precisely those features of our 
mind (animus) that are shared in common with non-rational animals.²⁰ 
Accordingly, the discussion in book 11 covers
¹⁷ For reasons we will consider presently, the trinitarian structures involved in sense cogni-tion so 
understood do not in fact constitute an imago Dei. Insofar as vestigial traces of the Trinity can be 
found in all created things, it is, nonetheless, possible to see a trinitarian likeness in the structure of 
perception.
¹⁸ Augustine cites Paul (2 Corinthians 4:16) for the distinction between the inner and outer man, 
but the distinction has Platonic sources as well. For more on this see Kaldreron, “Trinitarian 
Perception,” 25.
¹⁹ Augustine’s trinitarian analysis of thought as well as the methodology of inward ascent have 
precedent in the Neoplatonic tradition. For discussion of such influences, see Christopher Tournau, 
“The Background of Augustine’s Triadic Epistemology in De Trinitate 11–15,” in E. Bermon and G. 
O’Daly (eds.), Le De Trinitate de saint Augustin: exégèse, logique et noétique (Paris: Vrin, 2012), 251–
66.
²⁰ Augustine opens book 12 by explicitly delineating the boundary between the outer human being, 
with which he was concerned in book 11, and the inner human being to which he is turning in book 
12. The dividing line, he tells us, is rationality. “Well now, let us see where we are to locate what you 
might call the border between the outer and the inner human being. Anything in our mind (in 
animo) that we have in common with animals is rightly said to be still part of the outer human being. 
It is not just the body alone that is to be reckoned as the outer human, but the body with its own kind 
of life attached, which quickens the body’s structure and all the senses it is equipped with in order to 
sense things outside. And when the images of things sensed that are fixed in the memory are looked 
over again in recollection, it is still something belonging to the outer human being that is being 
done. In all these things, the only way that we differ from animals is that we are upright, not 
horizontal, in posture” (De Trin. 12.1).
both acts of cognizing external, material bodies, and acts of memory and
imagination, all of which involve sense-based representations.
Insofar as Augustine’s project is merely to uncover the trinitarian
structure of our non-rational, sense-based cognitive acts, his analysis is
not (and is not intended as) a full-blown or exhaustive treatment of
sense-based cognition. Rather, he focuses selectively on just those aspects 
of sense cognition relevant to his broader, theological pursuits. For the 
same reason, however, the precise cognitive application and implication 
of his analysis can be difficult to pin down. I begin, therefore, by simply 
tracing the details of his presentation of each of the two trinities of book 
11, namely, that of outer and inner vision respectively. Not surprisingly, 
each type of vision shares the same basic structure. Both outer and inner 
vision consist in a kind cognitive union between (i) the cognized object, 
on the one hand, and (ii) the relevant sensory power on the other. This 
cognitive
contact is facilitated by (iii) the will. Indeed, the act of ‘seeing’ or 
‘sight’ (visio) (where this is just the actualization of the relevant cognitive 
power in receiving the form or species of the object cognized) is 
itself the culmination of the will’s activity in directing awareness.
 3.1 Outer Vision. In presenting the details of this picture, 
Augustine begins by focusing on outer sense cognition—that is, on 
cognition of external, material objects. In developing his account, he uses 
vision as the representative sense power (though the basic analysis is 
intended to apply to any sense modality).²¹ Accordingly, the first 
trinitarian structure is a trinity of outer vision. Augustine presents it this 
way:
²¹ As Augustine explains, “So then, the outer person is endowed with sensation, and with it 
senses bodies; and this sensation, as can be readily verified, is divided into five parts, seeing, 
hearing, smelling, tasting, touching. But it would be too much, and quite unnecessary to ask all 
these five senses about what we are looking for. What one tells us will go for the others. So let us 
use for preference the evidence of the eyes; this is the most excellent of the body’s senses, and 
for all its difference in kind has the greatest affinity to mental vision” (De Trin. 11.1).
When we see some particular body, there are three things which we can
very easily remark and distinguish from each other. First of all there is
(i) the thing (res) we see, a stone or a flame or anything else that the eye
can see, which of course could exist even before it was seen. Next there
is (ii) the actual sight or vision (visio), which did not exist before we
sensed the object presented to the sense. Thirdly, there is (iii) what
holds the sense of the eyes on the thing being seen as long as it is being
seen, namely the soul’s intentional aim (animi intentio). These three
are not only manifestly distinct, but also different natures.
(De Trin. 11.2)
Here, Augustine opens by simply calling our attention to the three
constitutive elements of sensory seeing, namely: (i) the object or thing
(res) that is seen, (ii) the seeing (visio) itself, and (iii) the soul’s intentional
aim (animi intentio) upon the object. As Augustine will go on to make
clear, each of the three elements are not only distinct from one another,
but also jointly necessary for the occurrence of outer, bodily vision.
The mutual distinctness of each item from the other can be shown,
Augustine thinks, from the fact that (i) each has a different nature and
(ii) each can exist without the other. On Augustine’s view, “the visible
body is of quite a different nature than the sense of the eyes.” For, the
visible object is entirely corporeal, whereas the body’s sensory organs—
insofar as they are animated by the soul—are an “admixture” of body and
soul.²² But the soul’s intentional aim differs from both the visible body
and the sensory organs since it is a power that “belongs just to the
soul”—a fact which Augustine takes as evident given its active, volitional
nature.²³ Again, each constituent can exist without the others. Not only
can a visible object exist independently of being seen, but insofar as the
form received in the eyes is distinct from the body itself, it is also possible
²² On Augustine’s view, it is only because the soul is somehow present at or in the physical
organs that such organs are powers for sensory cognition. As he says: absent the soul (exanimae)
there is no capacity for bodily sensing. See De Trin. 11.2.
²³ In fact, at points, he refers to this third element of sensory cognition as a “volition” of the
soul. Cf. De Trin. 11.5. Although soul’s “intentio” functions as the third member both in the
trinities of outer and inner vision, Augustine tends to place more emphasis on the role of will
(voluntas) as the source of the soul’s intentional uniting with the objects stored in memory. See
MacDonald, “Augustine’s Cognitive Voluntarism,” for a discussion and limited defense of
Augustine’s conception of sense perception as involving volition.
for the eyes to be informed (at least for a time) even when the body itself
is no longer present.²⁴ Finally, the soul’s intentional aiming persists even
in the absence of a functioning sense organ or visible objects. After all,
Augustine claims, the soul’s “appetite for seeing (videndi appetitus)
remains intact whether this happens to be possible or not.”²⁵
While the main point of all of this is to establish the distinctness of 
each of the members of this trinity from the others, Augustine’s discus-
sion also makes clear why he thinks all three components are jointly 
necessary for outer vision. Without the first member of the trinity, 
namely, (i) the visible object, nothing would be seen. In such a case, there 
would be no uniting of the sensory organ of vision to an external visible 
object. Again, if a visible object is present, but without the eye being 
actually informed from it, there is no (ii) sight. After all, vision requires 
that the sense faculty actually take in, or receive, information
from the surrounding environment. But notice that this very event, 
namely, the eyes receiving such information, requires (iii), that the eyes 
are actually being directed at the relevant visible object. Seeing requires 
looking, as it were. In this regard, the cognitive contact that constitutes 
outer vision is, on Augustine’s model, the consummation of a prior 
inclination or will for seeing (voluntas videndi).²⁶ Together these three 
things—the object, the aiming to see, and the sight—yield what 
Augustine characterizes as “a kind of unity,” namely, the cognitive 
“joining” that constitutes bodily vision.²⁷
According to Augustine, this analysis of outer vision yields a trinitar-
ian image not merely because we have a case in which three distinct 
things yield a kind of unity (a single, unified cognitive event), but 
because the relations among the three reflect those that hold among the 
three persons of the Trinity. For example, the external object as the 
source of
²⁴ “It often happens that when we look at some lights for a little while and then close our 
eyes, certain luminous colors continue to revolve in our vision, changing their hues and 
gradually becoming less brilliant until they cease altogether. We can understand them as being 
the remnants of that form which was produced in the sense while we were looking at the 
luminous body . . . ” (De Trin. 11.4).
²⁵ De Trin. 11.2. ²⁶ See De Trin. 11.10.
²⁷ Here’s Augustine: “Although these three differ in nature they are compounded in a kind of 
unity, that is to say, the form of the body which is seen, and its image imprinted on the sense 
which is sight, or formed sense, and the volition of the soul (voluntas animi) which applies the 
sense to the sensible thing and holds sight on it” (De Trin. 11.5).
So it is that sight, that is the form which is produced in the sense of the
beholder, has its quasi-parent (quasi parens) in the form of the body
from which it is produced. But this is not a true parent, and so the
former is not a true offspring; it is not wholly begotten by it since
something else is presented to the visible body for sight to be formed
out of it, namely the sense of the one who is seeing . . . So the will which
joins them both together as quasi-parent and quasi-offspring is more
spiritual than either of them . . . . It does not proceed from that quasi-
parent, or for that matter from this quasi-offspring, [rather] . . . the will
was already there before sight occurred and it applied the sense of the
body to be formed from it by observing it. However it was not yet
pleased; how could it be with something not yet seen? (De Trin. 11.9)
In Augustine’s terminology, the external object is “quasi-parent” (i.e., 
analogue to the Father), and the informed eye its image and, so, 
“quasi-offspring” (i.e., analogue to the Son). The will for seeing (voluntas 
videndi), being neither parent nor offspring (and, hence, analogue to the 
Holy Spirit), completes the trinity in its role as what “joins them both 
together.” This trinity is not, of course, anything like a proper image of 
God given that, among other things, it is comprised of entities of wholly 
different natures (body, soul, and an admixture thereof) and so lacks the 
requisite unity. It is merely a start. From here we are ready to move to 
more inward operations of the soul—albeit still just insofar as the soul is 
occupied with sensory representations. Hence, Augustine turns now to 
his second sensory trinity: namely, that of inner vision.
 3.2. Inner Vision. Augustine begins his discussion of this 
second trinity by pointing out that when the species of an external 
object is received in a corporeal sense
bodily sight serves as the analogue to the first person of the Trinity, 
namely, God the Father. And because sight itself involves (i) a species—or 
likeness—of that object that is (ii) produced (or “begotten”) by that 
object, sight itself functions as the second person of the Trinity, namely, 
as God the Son. Augustine spells it out this way:
Even when the species of a body sensed by corporeal senses is taken
away, there remains a likeness of it in memory to which the will can
again turn its gaze to be formed by it from within just as the sense was
formed from without by the sensible body presented to it.
(De Trin. 11.6)
In this way, when stored sensory forms or species are utilized in occur-
rent acts of sensory awareness, we get a second sensory trinity: a trinity of
‘inner vision.’ Thus, Augustine continues:
And so one gets another trinity out of the memory and internal sight
and the will which couples them together; and when these three are co-
agitated (coguntur) into a unity the result is called cogitation or thought
(cogitare), from the very act of co-agitation (coactu). Nor among these
is there a difference in substance . . . . Instead of the species of the body
which was sensed outside, there now appears memory retaining (i) that
species which the soul (anima) drank in through the sense, and instead
of that external sight of the sense being formed from the sensible body,
we now have a similar (ii) internal sight when the soul’s gaze (acies
animi) is formed from what the memory retains, and absent bodies are
thought about (cogitantur); and (iii) the same will that, in the first case,
applied the sense for formation to body presented to it outside and kept
it joined to it once formed, now turns the gaze of the soul of the one
recollecting to the memory in an act of recollection for it to be formed
from what the memory has retained, and there is produced in thought
something like sight. (De Trin. 11.6)
As in the case of outer vision, Augustine characterizes inner vision as a
cognitive event in which a cognitive power is joined or united to its
object. In this case, however, the object in question is not an external
body, which, Augustine stipulates, is no longer present. Rather, the object
is a sensory representation of an external body—a species in memory;
and what is informed from it is not a corporeal eye, but the soul’s inner,
incorporeal gaze (acies animi). Nevertheless, it is “the same will that in
organ, it is (typically) also transmitted to memory. Thus, even when the 
object itself is no longer present it is possible, nevertheless, to recall it in 
an occurrent act of awareness.
the first case applied the sense for formation to the body presented to it
outside and kept it joined to it once formed, [that] now turns the soul’s
gaze to the memory.”²⁸
The uniting of the soul’s gaze (acies animi) to the species in memory
yields an occurrent, conscious act of sense-based awareness—or what
Augustine, in his usual way, refers to as ‘thought’ (cogitatio). Although 
the etymological connection between the Latin verb ‘cogere’ (to collect 
together or join) and the verb ‘cogitare’ (to think or cogitate) does not 
translate in English, it is precisely this connection that Augustine means 
to signal in using the term ‘thought’ (cogitatio) in this context. For, the 
actualization of the acies consists in its being conjoined to, and so 
informed by, a sense-representation present in memory—a conjunction 
that yields an act of conscious remembering. In cases where retained 
images are recombined in various ways (often in ways that do not
correspond to reality), the sense-based thought in question constitutes 
an act of imagination.²⁹ Either way, each type of act is an instance of 
inner vision: that is, a kind of interior awareness which, while not 
involving a bodily eye, nevertheless, yields “something like sight”—
namely, an inward seeing and, hence awareness, of a given sensory 
content.³⁰
Now, as Augustine’s discussion makes clear, acts of inner, sense-based 
thinking, namely, acts of remembering or imagination, are structurally 
isomorphic to acts of outer vision. In this case, the three members of the 
trinity are: (i) the inner object, namely, the species in the memory,
(ii) the inner seeing—i.e., the soul’s gaze (acies animi) being informed 
by the species from memory; and (iii) the intentional directedness of the 
soul or will (intentio voluntas) upon the inner object. Having identified 
the three constituents of this second trinity, Augustine goes on, as he did
²⁸ Cf. De Trin. 11.7.
²⁹ E.g., at De Trin. 11.17, Augustine notes that the will can act not only to unify conscious 
attention and the contents of memory, but also to creatively recombine such contents present in 
memory.
³⁰ It is only when inner vision occurs in the absence of (or absent attention to) corresponding 
external objects that it constitutes an act of memory or imagination. In such cases, what one is 
aware of is not anything in external reality, but something in memory or imagination. As will be 
clear, however, on my view, when inner vision occurs (i) as part of a unified process that 
includes outer vision, and (ii) has external bodies (not inner images) as object, the awareness is 
perceptual. (See section 4 below.)
So it is that in this series which begins with the species of the body and
ends with the species which is produced in the thinking gaze (contuitu
cogitantis), four species are brought to light, born as it were step by step
one from the other; the second from the first, the third from the
second, the fourth from the third. From (i) the species of the body
that is seen arises (ii) the species that is produced in the sense of one
seeing, and from this (iii) the one produced in the memory, and from
this (iv) the one that is produced in the gaze of the one thinking (acie
cogitantis). So the will couples quasi-parent with its offspring three
times: first the species of the body with the one it begets in the sense of
the body; next, this one with the one that is produced from it in the
memory; and then a third time this with the one that is brought forth
from it in the gaze of thought (cogitantis intuitu) . . . .And, in this series,
there are two visions: one of sensation, the other of thought. It is to
make possible the sight of thought that there is produced from the sight
of sensation something similar in the memory, which the gaze of the
soul can turn to in thought just as the gaze of the eyes turns to a body in
observing it. That is why I have wished to propose two trinities of this
kind, one when the sensation of sight is formed from the external body,
in the case of outer vision, to argue for the distinctness of each member; 
and he likewise calls attention to their unity in the production of inner 
vision. There is no need to survey the details of his discussion here except 
to note that, in this case, we get a unity that is much greater than that 
among the three constituents of outer vision. As Augustine observes: the 
three members of the trinity of inner vision “are not now differentiated 
by a diversity of nature but are of one and the same substance, since all of 
this is inside and it is all one soul” (De Trin. 11.7). For the same reason, 
the members of this trinity are likewise a better (though still far from 
proper) image of the relations among the first, second, and third persons 
of the divine Trinity.
Toward the very end of his discussion in book 11, Augustine sums up 
his results by considering the triune components of both outer and inner 
vision in the context of a broader, ordered series of sense-cognitive 
events. As this passage will be of particular significance for the discussion 
to come, it is worth quoting at length:
the other when the vision of thought is formed from internal memory.
But I did not wish to propose a middle trinity in between because it is
not usually called a vision when the form that is produced in the sense
of the observer is committed to memory. In every instance, however,
the will only appears as coupling quasi-parent with its offspring. And
for this reason, wherever it proceeds from, it cannot itself be called
parent or offspring. (De Trin. 11.16)
Here, Augustine shows how the trinities of outer and inner vision form
part of a series involving the transmission of sensory information from the
external world all the way to inner awareness. Indeed, because the process
starts with the external visible object, the sensible form of that object is
counted among the ‘species’ included in the series itself. Considered in this
way, the process as a whole includes: “four species . . . born, as it were, step
by step”; a three-fold coupling of “quasi-parent with its quasi-offspring” by
the will; and “two visions—one of sensation, one of thought.” Represented
in diagram fashion, we get something like Figure 1.
Interestingly, the chain of transmission Augustine presents here
includes an intermediate (and hitherto unmentioned) stage, namely,
one at which the species in the animated sense organ is transmitted (via
yet another conjunctive application of will) to memory. We will have
reason to return to this part of his discussion presently. For the moment,
it suffices just to call attention to the fact that, in his account of sensory
cognition, Augustine includes not merely an analysis of inner and outer
vision respectively, but also of their serial occurrence. And, he does so
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Figure 1 Trinities of outer vision
even though the middle stage in the series presents something of a 
complication for him. For in this middle stage, there is an object, an 
informing of a cognitive power, and a conjunctive application of will 
uniting them, yet the occurrence of the three do not constitute a trinity.
(And, apparently, this is because the information received in memory 
does not register in any distinct act of occurrent awareness and, so, does 
not constitute “vision of any sort.”)
4. Limits of the Trinitarian Analysis: Locating Perception 
in De Trin. 11
Having established the main elements of Augustine’s account of both 
outer and inner vision, the natural question to consider is this: to which
—and what range of—sense-cognitive states does the trinitarian analysis 
apply? One might very naturally suppose that Augustine intends his 
analysis as having fairly wide application; that is, we might think that he 
intends it to apply in a general way to all sense-based cognition. After all, 
Augustine tells us that his account of outer vision applies equally to any 
of the five outer, sensory faculties; and he is also explicit about the fact 
that his analysis of inner vision is applied both to acts of memory and 
imagination. Hence, on the face of it, it could appear that the analysis 
covers not only all modes of sense perception, but also occurrent states of 
sensory memory and imagination. Indeed, we could even take the 
unheralded, middle, pseudo-trinity of informed memory, as giving us an 
account of dispositional sensory memory.
This is not, however, what I think Augustine has in mind. Rather, as I 
read book 11, the trinitarian analyses Augustine develops have a rather 
narrower range of application. In particular, the two trinitarian images 
he develops do not apply to what we might think of as the central case of 
sensory cognition: namely, ordinary sense perception. In order to estab-
lish this, I begin with my negative thesis: namely, that what Augustine 
calls ‘outer vision’ is not plausibly identified with what we (or he) would 
think of as ordinary, paradigmatic cases of sense perception. And this is 
because, unlike ordinary cases of perceptual experience, the sensory 
states that Augustine classifies as instances of ‘outer vision’ are not
they have themselves perceived with their senses . . . . It does not seem
in this case as if our attention is being bent back to our memory to
³¹ Indeed, it would appear that, for Augustine, the activation of the soul’s gaze in an act of 
cogitatio is not only sufficient for conscious awareness, but also necessary. Cf. De Trin. 14.8: 
“Nothing can be in the mind’s view except what is being thought about.”
phenomenally conscious states. From here, it is a relatively short step to 
my positive thesis: namely, that insofar as perceptual awareness involves 
both the deliverances of the “outer” sense faculties, as well as the involve-
ment of “inner” faculties of both memory and the acies animi, sense 
perception turns out to be a kind of hybrid state—one involving the 
joint occurrence of both outer bodily sensing and inner conscious 
awareness.
 4.1 Negative Thesis: Outer Vision Is Not Perception.  In support of 
my negative thesis, I offer two kinds of evidence. The first comes from a 
close reading of a single, telling passage in book 11—one that I think 
sheds a good deal of light on the phenomenology Augustine associates 
with outer and inner vision respectively. The second sort of evidence 
comes from systematic considerations, having to do with Augustine’s 
broader views about conscious awareness. I begin with the latter, 
systematic considerations. It will be useful to have these consid-erations in 
mind before we turn to the key text.
 For starters, recall Augustine’s systematic identification of 
conscious awareness—at both the intellective and sensory level—with acts 
of cogi-tation or thought (cogitatio). As we have now seen, thought 
consists in the activation of the acies animi—i.e., the activation of the 
soul’s power for occurrent, conscious awareness. Thus, when the soul’s 
gaze is informed by a given content, that content is present within one’s 
con-scious field of view (contuitu cogitantis).³¹ In this way, the acies animi 
serves consistently, for Augustine, as the psychological mechanism for 
conscious awareness. Add to this the fact that, as Augustine points out in 
the following passage, the acies animi is always informed from memory.
We very frequently believe people when they tell us true things which
recalling them, but because someone else is telling us them . . . .
However, if we look at the matter a little more closely, not even in
this case do we depart from the limits set by memory. I could not even
begin to understand what he was telling me if I was hearing all the
things he said and what they added up to for the first time, and did not
have a general memory of each of them . . . . So the limits of thinking
are set by the memory just as the limits of sensing are set by bodies. The
senses receive the species of a thing from the body we sense, the
memory receives it from the senses, and the gaze of the one thinking
from the memory. (De Trin. 11.14)
As Augustine puts it here: “memory is the limit of thought.” You cannot,
in other words, have an act of cogitatio involving some content if that
content is not first in your memory. In this particular context, Augustine
is considering an example in which you are picturing an event narrated
to you by your friend. In the circumstance, it would seem that you are
thinking about something that is not, in fact, in your memory since the
story involves an event that did not happen to you. Thus, on the face of it,
the case appears to be a counterexample to the principle that the gaze of
thought is always informed by a content derived from one’s own mem-
ory. But, in response, Augustine simply denies that this is the case,
insisting instead that “if we look at the matter a little more closely, not
even in this case do we depart from the limits set by memory.” The point,
of course, is that our ability to understand the import of our friend’s story
owes to the fact we have concepts and experiences within our own
mind—memoria—to draw on. Thus, even in such a case, our conscious
thinking about the events in our friend’s story is informed by what is
present in our own memory. Augustine reinforces the point by reiterat-
ing, at the end of the passage, the process by which sensory information
reaches conscious awareness: “The senses receive the species of a thing
from the body we sense, the memory receives it from the senses, and the
gaze of the one thinking from the memory.”
The significance of all of this, for our purposes, is that this discussion
signals a general principle about the connection between conscious
awareness and memory: namely, the acies animi is always informed
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produce sights; after all, we are not thinking about them because we are
Here’s the text in its entirety:
[STAGE-1 FAILURE:] It is by movements of the body that it separates 
the senses of the body from the bodies to be sensed, either to avoid
from, and hence posterior to, memory. In other words, conscious sensory 
awareness, insofar as it requires the activation of the acies animi also 
necessarily requires the involvement of memory. Of course, insofar as 
conscious attention is selective and active, such awareness also involves a 
contribution from the will. Thus, the will’s contribution, as Augustine 
describes it, involves its activity in making some (but not others) of the 
representations that are present in memory salient in one’s conscious 
awareness. As Augustine says: “the will turns the gaze (acies) here and 
there and back again to be formed and once formed it keeps it joined to 
the image in memory” (De Trin. 11.7).
If all this is right—that is, if the acies is always informed from memory, 
and is directed by the will—we can expect that where there is both a failure 
of memory (i.e., some content fails to be taken up in memory) and a failure 
of will (i.e., absence of attention) there will be no conscious awareness. 
And, this, in fact, is precisely what Augustine says in a key passage.
The passage I have in mind comes toward the end of book 11. In it, 
Augustine is exploring the nature of will’s contribution to sense cogni-
tion. He pursues the matter, however, by considering what happens, 
cognitively speaking, when will is absent from one or more of the various 
stages of sense cognition. While Augustine typically lays emphasis on the 
will’s positive, unitive contribution to the formation and constitution of 
sensory states, in this text he calls attention to the fact that will’s activity 
can also be cited in explaining the non-occurrence of such states. Thus, 
in the opening lines, he points out that the will may act not only to apply 
one’s attention to some object, but also to avert it. He says: “Just as it is 
the will that fastens sense to body, so it is the will that fastens memory to 
sense and the gaze of the one thinking to the memory. And what fastens 
them together and assembles them also unfastens and separates them, 
namely the will again” (De Trin. 11.15). Augustine immediately goes on 
to specify particular ways in which the will can separate (rather than 
unify) a cognitive power and its object, and then to explain the cognitive 
outcome of such cases. What he has to say is illuminating.
them away from something we do not want to see . . . .Thus it is by
moving the body that the will avoids coupling the senses of the body to 
sensible things. And it does it as far as it can. When it suffers difficulty 
in this respect because of our condition of servile mortality, the result is 
torment, and nothing is left to the will but endurance.
[STAGE-2 FAILURE:] Memory is averted from sense by the will when, 
intent on something else, it does not allow present things to adhere to 
it. This is easy to observe when, as often happens, we are with someone 
talking to us and appear not to have heard what they are saying, 
because we are thinking of something else. It is not true, though; we 
have heard, but we do not remember the sounds slipping that very 
instant through our ears, because the will has been disinclined to give 
the permission which is needed as a rule to fix them in the memory. So 
it would be truer to say “We do not remember” than “We did not hear” 
when something like that happens. It also happens to people reading, 
extremely often at any rate to me, that I find I have read a page or a 
letter and have not the slightest idea what I have read, and have to 
repeat it. The will’s interest has been intent on something else and so 
the memory has not been applied to the sense of the body as that sense 
has been applied to the letters. So too, you go for a walk with your will 
intent on something else and so you do not know what path you have 
taken. If you actually had not seen, you would either not have gone for 
the walk or you would have walked by feeling your way with great 
attention, especially if you were going along a way you did not know.
But you walked quite easily, so of course you did see . . . .
[STAGE-3 FAILURE:] Finally, the way the will averts the gaze of the 
soul from what is in the memory is simply by not thinking about it.
(De Trin. 11.15)
The cases Augustine identifies here fall into three groups, each correspond-
ing, respectively, to a failure at one of the three stages of will’s application 
depicted in Figure 1, which, for convenience, I reproduce here.
Before considering the precise significance of this passage vis-à-vis my 
negative thesis, it will be useful to begin by first reviewing the basic 
details of each of the three types of case Augustine considers.
sensing or to stop sensing something; as when we shut our eyes or turn
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Figure 1 Trinities of outer vision
The first set of cases Augustine considers (those labeled as ‘stage-1
failures’ in the text) are cases in which there is a failure of the will’s
application at the very first stage of sense cognition. Here, the failure of
application of the sense organs to the external object consists in the will
positively acting so as to separate the “senses of the body” from “bodies
that are to be sensed.” It does so, for example, by simply averting the
relevant sensory organ—say, by willing to shut or avert the eyes, cover
one’s ears or nose, etc. In these cases, will’s role is characterized in terms
of resistance. As the examples make clear, where will succeeds in separ-
ating, it prevents or terminates outer vision.³² And where there is no
outer vision, there is, of course, no awareness whatsoever of the
surrounding physical environment.³³ Stage-1 failures thus represent
absence of any outer, bodily sensing.
³² Augustine does allow, however, that even if one wills against the application of senses to 
corporeal objects, outer vision may, nevertheless, persist. In such cases, he describes the subject 
as “unwillingly enduring” an act of outer vision. Here the famous scene from Clockwork Orange 
comes to mind in which the central character, Alex, has his eyes wired open and is forced to 
watch violent films. But perhaps Augustine himself had Plato’s case of Leontius and the corpses 
in mind (Republic IV, 439e–40a).
³³ Outer vision fails not only in cases where the will actively resists application of the senses 
to external bodies, but also when the senses of body are inert for some reason (as in sleep, or as 
in cases of physical defect say, blindness/deafness), or, more rarely, in cases in which the soul’s 
“intentional aim” (animi intentio) is  “fixed by a kind of necessity on some inner image” (as in 
cases of madness, divination, or spiritual ecstasy). Augustine offers a fuller description of cases 
of the latter sort elsewhere in De Trin. 11 and there he characterizes them as cases in which the 
will “concentrates its whole energy on the inner image (interiorem phantasiam), and withdraws 
the gaze of the soul altogether from the presence of the bodies that surround the senses, and 
from the senses of the body themselves, and directs it utterly on the image that is seen 
within” (De Trin. 11.7). Thus, while the eyes might even be open (or other senses equally at the 
ready), the subject, nonetheless, senses nothing—there is no awareness of perceptible objects. 
Augustine considers similar cases in De Genesi ad litteram; see for example Gen. Litt. 12.25 
and 12.27.
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Outer Vision
In the second set of cases (namely, those labeled ‘stage-2 failures’), 
there is a failure in the application of memory to information present in 
sense organs. Outer vision exists, but its input is not recorded in mem-
ory. In these cases, the failure owes not to active resistance on the part of 
the will, but to distraction. When one’s attention is sufficiently focused 
elsewhere (because, say, will is “intent on something else”), the data 
received by the outer senses is neither registered nor processed in 
memory. Where there is a stage-2 failure, information in bodily senses 
simply does not penetrate further than the outer senses.
The final type of case (namely, ‘stage-3 failures’) represents the select-
ive nature of occurrent, sense-based thought. Since there is more present 
in memory than is (or can be) entertained in any occurrent act of 
awareness (be it an act of memory, imagination, etc.), the will functions 
to separate the soul’s gaze from any range of sensory contents by simply 
failing to bring or “apply” the acies to them (or, presumably, by actively 
resisting doing so).³⁴ What stage-3 failures show, then, is just that 
consciousness of a given (non-rational) content does not occur without 
the soul’s gaze being applied-to or informed-from memory. This, of 
course, fits the general model outlined above.
With these details in mind, we are now better positioned to consider the 
import of the passage for the thesis that outer vision is not—by itself—
sufficient for perception. Indeed, what is particularly valuable about 
Augustine’s presentation of these cases—especially the cases of failure at 
stage 2—is the way in which it allows us to isolate the occurrence of outer, 
physiological sensing from more inward psychological processing. Doing so 
allows us to identify not only what sort of state, and what kind of phenom-
enal experience, outer vision yields when it occurs on its own, but also what 
states correspond to its conjunction and coordination with inner awareness.
For starters, what Augustine’s discussion shows is that outer vision 
can, in principle, occur without the informing of memory, or the
³⁴ Likely, Augustine would allow, as he does for outer vision, that inner seeing can occur 
against (or without) one’s willing it. Consider, e.g., nightmares, or cases in which you are unable 
to get a song out of your mind, or in which someone is haunted by the vivid memory of a 
traumatic event.
are, conscious of what is going on in his mind . . . . The driver in the automatic state is one whose
‘inner eye’ is shut: who is not currently aware of what is going on in his ownmind” (“The Nature
of Mind,” 14).
subsequent informing of the soul’s gaze. This alone—given what we have
already seen of Augustine’s systematic account of the psychological
mechanisms associated with consciousness—suggests that outer vision
is a non-conscious or sub-conscious mode of awareness. Not only that,
but the three examples Augustine offers to illustrate the nature of isolated
outer vision support precisely this conclusion. Each involves some failure 
of awareness. His first example is a case in which someone in your 
vicinity is talking—say, giving a lecture in your department—but, having 
gotten distracted by thoughts about an upcoming appointment, you 
discover that you have not been hearing anything. In the second case 
you are reading (perhaps this very paper) but then you realize that, 
although your eyes have been scanning the words and your hands 
turning the pages, you “have not the slightest idea what [you] have just 
read.” The final example is Augustine’s analogue to David Armstrong’s
famous example of the long-distance truck-driver.³⁵ In Augustine’s ver-
sion, however, “you go for a walk with your will intent on something else 
and so you do not know what path you have taken.” Unlike cases in 
which outer vision fails, in each of these examples there is clearly some 
level of sensory awareness. Indeed, as Augustine points out in the 
walking case, you manage to reach your destination safely and without 
feeling your way, so, “you did see.” On the other hand, he is also keen to 
emphasize that in each case you also fail to experience any sensory 
awareness. Thus, it appears to you that you have not heard, not read, 
nor observed the path by which you walked.
³⁵ See David Armstrong, “The Nature of Mind,” in The Nature of Mind and Other Essays 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 1–15. Armstrong’s case, which has become quite 
familiar in the current literature on consciousness, runs as follows: “If you have driven for a very 
long distance without a break, you may have had experience of a curious state of automatism, 
which can occur in these conditions. One can suddenly ‘come to’ and realize that one has driven 
for long distances without being aware of what one was doing, or, indeed, without being aware 
of anything. One has kept the car on the road, used the brake and the clutch perhaps, yet all 
without any awareness of what one was doing” (“The Nature of Mind,” 12). Armstrong claims 
that in such a case “something mental is lacking” and he goes on to argue that what’s lacking on 
the part of the driver is awareness of his perception of the road. “The driver in a state of 
automatism perceives, or is aware of, the road. If he was not, the car would be in a ditch. But he 
is not currently aware of his awareness of the road. He perceives the road, but he does not 
perceive his perceiving, or anything else that is going on in his mind. He is not, as we normally
“we have heard, but we do not remember the sounds . . . . So, it would be
truer to say ‘we do not remember’ than ‘we did not hear.’ ” Likewise, in
the case of inattentive walking. As I have just noted, Augustine insists:
“you walked quite easily, so you did see.”Onemight think, therefore, that
what stage-2 failures represent is not a failure of conscious perceptual
awareness, butmerely a failure to recall its (perhaps fleeting) occurrence.³⁶
Although this alternative reading of stage-2 failure has some initial
plausibility, it is here that reflection on the broader, systematic consider-
ations just canvassed can serve to guide our interpretation. It goes without
saying that stage-2 failures are rightly characterized chiefly as a failure of
memory: after all, they are cases in which the will has not applied the
memory to the external sense organs. Thus, information present in the
senses has not been taken up or processed by memory. What this means,
however, is that such information is also not received in the acies animi.
For, what we have now seen is that, on Augustine’s view, the acies is
always informed frommemory. Thus, where there is no uptake of sensory
content in memory there is no possibility for its uptake in one’s conscious
field of view. Hence such cases cannot represent failure to recall conscious
perceptual experiences. No such experience has (yet) occurred.
When, therefore, Augustine insists that “you did see” or “you did
hear,” he is merely highlighting the occurrence of outer, bodily vision
and outer, bodily hearing. After all, it is precisely the fact that outer
seeing (and hearing) does occur in such cases that distinguishes them
³⁶ I am grateful to Scott MacDonald for calling my attention to (and pressing) this alternative
reading of the passage.
The reason you seem not to have heard or seen anything is that, in 
such cases, you do not have any awareness or experience of outer acts of 
bodily sensing. For when outer vision occurs without simultaneously 
engaging memory and the soul’s gaze, its deliverances fail to register at 
the level of conscious awareness. What stage-2 failures show, then, is that 
outer vision alone is not sufficient for perceptual awareness. It is, rather, 
a sub- or non-conscious mode of awareness.
Admittedly, in describing such cases, Augustine places particular 
emphasis on them being instances of a failure of memory. For example, 
in the case where we are inattentive to someone who is speaking, he says:
from instances of stage-1 failure—namely, cases where outer vision also 
fails. But such seeing and hearing is nothing more than the actualization 
of the external sense organs in receiving the species of external bodies. 
And this, as I have been arguing, is not sufficient for perceptual experi-
ence. For that we need the informing of the soul’s gaze.
So much for the defense of my negative thesis: namely, that outer 
vision is not the equivalent of sense perception. It is, I think, a fairly short 
step from the negative thesis to my second, positive thesis—namely, that 
perception is a hybrid state requiring not only the occurrence of outer 
vision, but the simultaneous contributions of memory and inner vision. 
It is, therefore, to the defense of this thesis that I now turn.
 4.2  Positive Thesis: Perception Is a Hybrid State.  If outer vision 
(taken by itself ) is a non-conscious mode of sensory processing, and 
inner vision (again, taken by itself ), while conscious, is not a form of 
perceptual awareness, we might be tempted to conclude that the trinities 
of sense cognition Augustine identifies in book 11 are not relevant to or 
even intended as part of an analysis of ordinary conscious perception. If 
Augustine’s project in book 11 is simply to focus on those sensory states 
susceptible of a trinitarian analysis, perhaps it is a mistake to expect an 
analysis that applies to all or even the paradigmatic cases of sense-based 
cognition. Indeed, it may be that Augustine’s discussion in book 11 
omits conscious perceptual states altogether in order to focus singularly 
on sensory states that fit the trinitarian model he seeks to illuminate.
 In fact, however, I think this is not the case. As we have 
seen, Augustine’s discussion in De Trin. 11 includes not only an 
individual analysis of outer and inner vision, respectively, but also 
consideration of them together as an ordered series. Although no 
single stage in this series—taken by itself—constitutes ordinary 
conscious perception, it is plausible to think that Augustine intends 
the whole series together to provide us with an account of just this 
phenomenon. Indeed, it seems no accident that, immediately after 
discussing the separation cases, Augustine turns directly to consider 
“the series which begins with the
species of a body and ends with the species which is produced in the 
thinking gaze.”
I have already made the case for thinking that outer vision, by itself, 
does not constitute perception. It is quite clear, moreover, that just the 
first two stages alone (i.e., outer vision, plus the informing of memory) 
are likewise insufficient for conscious perceptual awareness. As 
Augustine himself points out, there isn’t anything rightly “called vision 
when the form that is produced in the sense of the observer is committed 
to memory.” Rather, conscious awareness requires the activation of the 
soul’s gaze. It is likewise clear, moreover, that the third stage (i.e., the 
activation of inner vision) depends on the second as it is not possible for 
the soul’s gaze to be informed directly from the outer senses: acies is 
always informed from memoria. Hence, consciousness of a given content 
does not occur without the soul’s gaze being applied to and, thereby, 
informed from memory.
Hence, conscious sense perception appears to require all three mem-
bers of the series: namely, (i) actualization of the sense organs by species 
received from external objects, (ii) memory’s reception of this sensory 
information, and (iii) the immediate activation of inner gaze by the 
sensory information thus received by memory from the senses. Without 
the first component, namely, the actualization of the sense organs, there 
is no outer vision—no awareness of external bodies. Without the second 
component, namely, memory’s reception of infor-mation from the 
senses, there is no content available to inform the soul’s conscious gaze. 
And lacking the third component, there is no conscious awareness of 
information present to the senses. Hence, my positive thesis: conscious 
perception is a hybrid state requiring the tandem activation of the 
mechanisms involved in both outer and inner vision.
If this is right, however, it turns out that perception is not itself any 
kind of trinity. After all, the ordered series that constitutes an occurrent 
perceptual state includes four species, two visions, and three applications 
of the will. Still, perceptual awareness is comprised from such trinities: 
namely, trinities of outer and inner vision. Indeed, taken together (or, 
rather, in various combinations), the mechanisms required for both 
outer vision, inner vision, and memory appear to supply the basic 
cognitive ingredients (or sub-structure) for a broad (perhaps even
exhaustive) range of sensory cognitive states. In this regard, then, what-
ever the limits of the range of states included under inner and outer
vision taken singly, the analysis of sense cognition offered in De Trin. 11,
can be seen as having a fairly broad application.
5. Memory and the Trinitarian Mind
I have been arguing that, taken singly, neither of two sensory trinities 
Augustine discusses in De Trin. 11 yields an analysis of sense perception. 
My argument rests both on the assumption that sense-perceptual aware-
ness is, paradigmatically, conscious as well as on the contention that 
conscious awareness requires the activation of the acies animi. That such 
awareness requires the informing of the soul’s gaze is, I believe, beyond
dispute: not only does Augustine explicitly identify conscious awareness 
with episodic acts of thinking (cogitatio), but also explicitly analyzes the 
latter in terms of the actualization of the soul’s acies. This is not surpris-
ing given Augustine’s commitment to the view that it is the soul (and not 
the body) that is the subject of conscious experience.³⁷
I have also argued that careful attention to the details of Augustine’s 
discussion in book 11 shows that the acies animi is activated upon 
receiving sensory information present in memoria. Thus, on my reading 
of Augustine, it turns out that perceptual awareness requires that sensory 
information be received in memory prior to its informing conscious
³⁷ Cf. De Trin. 11.2: “Nevertheless, it is the soul, conjoined to the body, that senses through a 
bodily instrument.” Augustine lays emphasis on the soul as the subject of sensory or bodily 
awareness in other contexts as well. For example, in Gen. Litt., he claims that it is “not the body 
that is the subject of sensation, but the soul through the body” (Gen. Litt. 3.7) and argues that 
“even bodily pain in any animate creature is itself a great and wonderful power of the soul” 
(Gen. Litt. 3.25). Part of what motivates Augustine’s insistence on this point is his commitment 
to the view that the soul exercises at least some agency in directing its awareness toward one 
thing rather than another. But if it is the soul that is the source of such agency, it must also be the 
subject of the awareness thus achieved. To be clear, however, to say that the soul is the subject of 
conscious experience does not entail any kind of transparency thesis. For example, just because 
the soul animates the body, it does not follow that it is thereby conscious of all bodily operations. 
Indeed, it is precisely Augustine’s rejection of such a transparency thesis that motivates his 
insistence on the limits of the soul’s gaze. Conscious awareness requires that a given content is 
present to the acies, not just that it is present somehow in the soul (e.g., in the animated sense 
organs or in memory).
³⁸ E.g., at De Trin. 15.40, Augustine sums up his account this way: “I have been attributing to
memory all that we know even though we are not thinking about it . . . . But there are more
hidden depths in our memory, where we found this thing even when we thought about it for the
first time.” Cf. section 2 above.
³⁹ I do not claim to be particularly original in calling attention to memory’s role in
perception. O’Daly, for example, has a lot to say on this score (Augustine’s Philosophy of
Mind, chapter 3). Still, much more attention has been given to the role played by will in
Augustine’s account of perception than the role played by memory.
awareness. On the face of it, this result is perhaps somewhat surprising. 
For, while it is natural to suppose that memory is needed to recall a 
perceptual experience, it is far less obvious that memory should be a 
prerequisite for such experience. Thus, even if my reading is well-
motivated in the context of the details of Augustine’s discussion in 
book 11, it is harder to see what broader motivation there could be for 
assigning memory such a role in sense perception. Indeed, absent such 
motivation, one might be inclined to resist my interpretation on grounds 
of charity if nothing else.
As it turns out, however, such motivation is not far to seek. I want to 
conclude, therefore, by briefly situating my reading of De Trin. 11 vis-à-
vis some of Augustine’s wider philosophical and theological 
commitments. Doing so has the benefit of both highlighting the broader 
plausibility of Augustine’s views as well as providing further 
corroboration and support for my interpretation of book 11.
To begin, it is worth bearing in mind that, for Augustine, the notion of 
memory is extremely broad. Memory is not strictly identified with a 
single psychological faculty or power, and its function goes well beyond 
the basic role of retaining and recollecting past experiences. In general, 
memory functions, for Augustine, as a kind of principle or source of 
human knowing and thinking. Thus, in some sense, memory encom-
passes everything we can mentally access or think about (or love, or seek)
—even when we are not currently doing so.³⁸ That said, it remains true 
that memory’s function in sense-based cognition is largely that of 
gathering and holding information received in the external sense organs. 
In this capacity, however, it plays a key role in structuring conscious 
perceptual awareness.³⁹ In this respect, memory’s function in perception 
is continuous with the role it plays in mental activity in general: namely, 
as a principle or source of occurrent awareness.
⁴⁰ De musica 6.21. 
⁴¹ Ibid.
⁴² De libero arbitrio 2.7. In this context, however, he speaks of the relevant faculty not as 
memory, but only as “a kind of inner sense to which everything is conveyed from the five 
familiar senses” and which is “neither sight nor hearing nor smell nor taste nor touch, but some 
other thing that presides over all of them.” Interestingly, Augustine assigns to this faculty the 
same sort of role he assigns to memory in other contexts, including that of facilitating conscious 
awareness of sensible objects. For more discussion of inner sense in De libero arbitrio and the 
way it fits within Augustine’s account of perception in other works see Charles Brittain, “Non-
Rational Perception in the Stoics and Augustine,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 22 
(2002), 288ff.
To see what I have in mind, let us take a particular example—one of 
Augustine’s own—namely, one involving memory’s role in our (audi-
tory) perception of language. Because spoken words are comprised of 
syllables consecutively articulated, it is clear, Augustine thinks, that our 
ability to perceive even a single word requires the retention of sensory 
input in memory. As Augustine says, in De Genesi ad litteram: “unless 
the spirit immediately formed in itself an image of the voice heard by the 
ears and stored it in memory, you would not know that the second 
syllable was second since the first, having vanished after striking the 
ear, no longer exists.” Thus, insofar as the sounding of a word is a 
temporally extended event, there needs to be some way to retain and 
structure sensory information in order to generate a unified perceptual 
experience. This is the role memory performs. Augustine makes this 
explicit when discussing the same example in De musica: “unless mem-
ory helps us when we hear even the shortest syllable . . . we  cannot say 
that we have heard anything.”⁴⁰ The same will hold true, Augustine 
thinks, for other sense modalities as well. For each sense is directed 
upon complex, extended objects—the parts of which cannot be grasped 
all at once. Augustine points out, for example, that memory is likewise 
required for perception of shape: the sense of touch and vision, say, 
cannot always take in the whole of a three-dimensional object simultan-
eously (e.g., side to side, front and back). Hence, here too memory 
receives, retains and integrates visual representations of the shape (or 
feel) of corporeal bodies.⁴¹ Not only that, but insofar as perceptual 
awareness requires the integration of sensory input both within a single 
sense faculty, and also across distinct modalities—a point to which 
Augustine calls attention in book 2 of De libero arbitrio—it is natural 
to suppose that memory plays a role here as well.⁴²
thought . . . .The sound undoubtedly reaches the ears . . . but . . . the
impetus of that [sound’s] motion is immediately extinguished because
of the soul’s interest being on something else. If the impetus remained,
it would remain in the memory so that we would both find it and
perceive that we had heard. (De musica 6.21)⁴⁴
What is required for auditory perception, thus, is that sensory represen-
tations are held in memory in order that the soul may “find” them there
⁴³ Because Augustine wants to defend a view according to which perception is efficiently
caused by the soul (rather than by external bodies) he is wont to emphasize the soul’s active,
ongoing role in generating sensory representations from information present in the senses. For
example, in Gen. Litt. 12.33 he tells us that “although we first see a body which we had not seen
before, and from that moment its image begins to be in our spirit, by which we can remember it
when it is no longer there in front of us, still it is not the body that makes its own image in the
spirit, but the spirit itself which makes it in itself with a wonderful swiftness that is infinitely
removed from the sluggishness of the body. Thus, no sooner is the body seen by the eyes than its
image is formed without the slightest interval of time in the spirit of the person seeing.” What
Augustine’s discussion in the De musica passage quoted just above seems to suggest, however, is
that the mere production of such images does not ensure their reception or retention in
memory.
⁴⁴ The full text runs as follows: “Thus, unless memory helps us when we hear even the
shortest syllable, so that the motion, which was created when the beginning sounded, remains in
our soul during that moment of time, when no longer the beginning but the end of the syllable is
sounding, we cannot say that we have heard anything. This is the reason why it often appears to
us that we have not heard people speaking in front of us when we were occupied by some other
thought, and this happens not because the soul does not produce those occurring rhythms at
that moment—since the sound undoubtedly reaches the ears, and since the soul cannot be
inactive during this reaction of its body, nor can it be moved in a different way than if this reaction
did not take place—but because the impetus of that motion is immediately extinguished because
of the soul’s interest being on something else. If the impetus remained, it would remain in the
memory so that we would both find it and perceive that we had heard” (De musica 6.21).
In general, then, Augustine is both explicit and consistent in defending
—on philosophical grounds—the view that perception consti-tutively 
involves not merely the activation of the external sensory organs in 
receiving species of external bodies, but also the production, retention, 
and integration of sensory representations in memory.⁴³ He is equally 
explicit, moreover, that without this, perceptual awareness is not pos-
sible. Where there is a failure of uptake in memory, there is nothing to 
structure or inform conscious awareness—in which case, Augustine will 
say, there is no perception.
This is the reason why it often appears to us that we have not heard   
people speaking in front of us when we were occupied by some other
Thoughts are a kind of utterance of the heart . . . though just because we
say thoughts are utterances of the heart does not mean they are not also
acts of seeing (visiones), arising when they are true from vision of
awareness (de visionibus notitiae). When these things happen
⁴⁵ It is worth noting that the claim that inner representations are involved in structuring
perceptual awareness need not entail that such representations are the object of perceptual
experience. Thus, I do not mean to be saddling Augustine with the sort of view that O’Daly
attributes to him, namely, that, for Augustine, “sense perception is perception of incorporeal
images of the objects perceived” (O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 106). It is perfectly
compatible with the view I am advancing that the external body—not an inner likeness of it—
serves as the object of perceptual awareness. For a defense of the view that external things are
objects of perception, see Brittain, “Non-Rational Perception,” Silva, “Augustine on Active
Perception,” and Gareth Matthews, “Knowledge and Illumination,” in D. Meconi and
E. Stump (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2014), 171–85.
⁴⁶ The image of the verbum is first introduced in book 9 (at 9.12ff.) but Augustine discusses
and develops it further in book 15 (at 15.17–26).
and, thus, “perceive that we have heard.” It is in this sense, then, that 
memory functions as a kind of antecedent principle or source of percep-
tual awareness. To the extent that memory is needed to inform and 
structure the soul’s awareness of external, corporeal reality, there is good 
reason for Augustine’s insisting on memory’s functional priority—
sensory content must be received in memory in order that we may be 
conscious of it.⁴⁵
There are, finally, significant theological considerations motivating 
Augustine’s view about both the priority and necessity of memory’s 
role in perceptual awareness. As I noted at the outset, on Augustine’s 
view, occurrent conscious awareness (be it an act of thinking involving 
non-rational, sensory content, or one involving purely intelligible con-
tent) manifests a trinitarian structure. The best way to see Augustine’s 
commitment to a trinitarian analysis of thought is to note that while he 
habitually relies on metaphors involving vision or sight to characterize 
acts of thinking, he also introduces and develops a second metaphor: 
namely, thought as inner word (verbum).⁴⁶ It turns out that conscious 
thinking can be regarded not only as a kind of inner vision or seeing, but 
also and equally as an inner word or kind of speaking. As Augustine 
explains:
(De Trin. 15.18)
While Augustine is often willing to move freely between metaphors of
inner seeing and speaking, the image of thought as the soul’s word
(verbum) carries important theological resonance, especially in connec-
tion with the broader trinitarian aims that guide his project. For, under-
stood as word, conscious thought serves as mind’s analogue to the
second person of the Trinity—namely, God the Son, the divine Word
spoken by God the Father (the first person of the Trinity).⁴⁷ Note,
however, that in the human mind, it is memory that always functions
as the analogue to the first person of the Trinity.⁴⁸ Thus, it is memory
that must beget—i.e., be the source or principle of—acts of conscious
thought. As Augustine tells us:
All these things then that the human soul knows by perceiving them
through itself or though the senses of the body or through the testi-
mony of others, it holds onto where they are stacked away in the
treasury of memory (thesauro memoriae condita). From them is begot-
ten (gignitur) a true word when we utter what we know . . . .For it
is then that the word (verbum) is most like the thing known,
and most its image because the sight that belongs to thinking (visio
cogitationis) springs direct from the sight that belongs to knowing
(visione scientiae) . . . . (De Trin. 15.22)
It is precisely the fact that the soul’s gaze is formed from memory that
secures the trinitarian image in general, and conscious thought as begot-
ten word in particular. As Augustine says, “our word, the one that has
⁴⁷ Here, of course, Augustine is drawing on the Gospel of John (John 1:1) where Jesus is
introduced as the Word of God and as the Word made flesh (John 1:14). See De Trin. 15.19–20.
⁴⁸ See, for example, De Trin. 15.40: “Certainly I have been trying as best I could to delineate
God the Father and God the Son—that is, God the begetter, who in his Word co-eternal with
himself somehow or other uttered all that he has substantially, and God this Word of his, who
also substantially has neither more nor less than what is in him who begot him as a true and not
a falseWord—I have been trying to delineate all this, not as it might already be seen face-to-face,
but as it might be seen by whatever kind of limited inference from this likeness in a puzzle,
which we find in the memory and understanding of our mind. In this likeness I have been
attributing to memory all that we know even if we are not thinking about it, and to intelligence
in the proper sense a kind of formation of thought.”
outwardly through the body, speech is one thing, sight another; but 
when we think inwardly they are both one and the same.
⁴⁹ De Trin. 15.24.
⁵⁰ This equality and unity is at the very heart of the image of the verbum. See, for example, De 
Trin. 15.19: “For when we utter something true, that is when we utter what we know, a word is 
necessarily born from the knowledge we hold in memory, a word which is absolutely the same 
kind of thing as the knowledge it was born from.” Indeed, it is for this reason (i.e., failure of 
substantial unity) that outer vision fails to generate a proper image of the trinity.
⁵¹ I am deeply grateful to Scott MacDonald and Charles Brittain, who generously included 
me in a series of workshops and seminars they organized around the De Trinitate starting in the 
early 2000s. It is thanks to them that I began thinking about De Trinitate as a whole and, later, 
about these issues in book 11 more specifically. I have learned an enormous amount from both 
of them over the years. Back in 2012, I gave a very early version of this paper at a SMRP 
memorial session honoring Gareth Matthews (to whom I am also indebted for much of what I 
know about Augustine) and, more recently, I presented it at the 2019 Cornell Summer 
Colloquium in Medieval Philosophy. I’m grateful to audiences on both occasions for their 
valuable feedback. Finally, thanks go to Therese Scarpelli Cory, Mary Sirridge, Jeff Brower, 
Brent Brower-Toland, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on previous drafts of 
the paper.
neither sound nor thought of sound . . . is  at  least something like that 
Word of God which is also God since this one [in us] is born of our 
knowledge just as that one was born of the Father’s.”⁴⁹
Here, then we have further—and, in this case, theological—motivation 
for the priority of memory in perceptual awareness. After all, if, as the 
foregoing passages suggest, the informing of the acies animi in percep-
tual awareness is itself a kind of inner word, then such awareness (qua 
analogue of God the Son) must have memory (qua analogue of God the 
Father) as its immediate source and principle. Awareness, in other 
words, must be produced by or “begotten from” memory. Not only 
that, but where memory serves as the source of conscious awareness, 
there is the requisite equality and substantial unity between that which 
begets (memoria) and what is begotten (informed acies): both are the soul 
itself.⁵⁰ In light of this, it is difficult to see how perceptual awareness 
could qualify as an image of the Word if it is not formed from memory. 
And yet it seems quite clear that Augustine means for such awareness to 
count as an image (or, at least a quasi-image) of the divine Verbum.⁵¹
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